Bentonite Vulnerability

 SUBMISSION TO THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT AGENCY OF CANADA (IAAC)  

Reference: Project 88774 – Deep Geological Repository (DGR) for Canada’s Used Nuclear Fuel

Subject: SUBMISSION No. 3.  B ENTONITE VULNERABILITY IN THE PRESNCE OF BRINE

Note: This submission was developed by the author with technical assistance from AI to synthesize international reports, hydrogeological data, and chemical modeling

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I. THE FALLACY OF SITE SUPERIORITY  

The Proponent (NWMO) characterizes the Revell site as a "homogenous" and "stable" environment. However, a technical comparison reveals it shares the same systemic flaws as its predecessors: 

• The Pinawa Parallel: The Revell Batholith is geologically analogous to the Lac du Bonnet Batholith  (https://can01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mhs.mb.ca%2Fdocs%2Fsites%2Faeclundergroundlab.shtml&data=05%7C02%7Cnuclearwaste-dechetsnucleaires%40iaac-aeic.gc.ca%7Cded7e0d8a36c4979bdc508de70fe7f5c%7C35d07687f4f24fbc8b3efa87a26b3b7b%7C0%7C0%7C639072436234078398%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C60000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=Hi%2BbU8gh3P5dAtkuzR5ufOYxCUbeoc6R9GYieF5Xzr0%3D&reserved=0)(Pinawa), where research at the Whiteshell Underground Research Laboratory  (https://can01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fen.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FUnderground_Research_Laboratory&data=05%7C02%7Cnuclearwaste-dechetsnucleaires%40iaac-aeic.gc.ca%7Cded7e0d8a36c4979bdc508de70fe7f5c%7C35d07687f4f24fbc8b3efa87a26b3b7b%7C0%7C0%7C639072436234107123%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C60000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=zyswT8Ls1FixFC%2B%2BfEwwIEAjSD5%2BBC2PRWsX%2B%2BoSBZE%3D&reserved=0)(443m depth) proved that "solid" granite is intersected by unpredictable, water-bearing fracture zone.

• The Forsmark (Sweden) Precedent: The Forsmark site  (https://can01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fskb.com%2Ffuture-projects%2Fthe-spent-fuel-repository%2F&data=05%7C02%7Cnuclearwaste-dechetsnucleaires%40iaac-aeic.gc.ca%7Cded7e0d8a36c4979bdc508de70fe7f5c%7C35d07687f4f24fbc8b3efa87a26b3b7b%7C0%7C0%7C639072436234127582%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C60000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=WQnekSgbKqnIwI2y416qxuOUyWUSopgySMhnCUFRQBY%3D&reserved=0)demonstrated that crystalline shield rock is a high-salinity environment. The Swedish Land and Environmental Court previously halted their project due to concerns that deep brine would accelerate copper canister corrosion. 

II. DEBUNKING THE "DRY ROCK" NARRATIVE  

The NWMO’s "Safety Case" relies on the existence of stagnant "pore water" as proof of isolation. This is factually undermined by the Proponent’s own operational contingencies: 

• The 10% Tunnel Rejection Admission: The NWMO admits to budgeting for a 10% rejection of placement tunnels  (https://can01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ourcommons.ca%2FContent%2FCommittee%2F441%2FENVI%2FBrief%2FBR12992638%2Fbr-external%2FWeTheNuclearFreeNorth-e.pdf&data=05%7C02%7Cnuclearwaste-dechetsnucleaires%40iaac-aeic.gc.ca%7Cded7e0d8a36c4979bdc508de70fe7f5c%7C35d07687f4f24fbc8b3efa87a26b3b7b%7C0%7C0%7C639072436234148182%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C60000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=f3qdzw%2B8bB1NZnCuESghjoOPKxNhaPrEZSWdiYiBjcI%3D&reserved=0)due to unforeseen water inflow. This proves that surface-based detection cannot see water-bearing fractures before excavation.

• The Scientific Blind Spot: The NWMO is attempting to map a "shattered windshield" of approximately 4,700 surface lineaments on the Revell batholith using data from only six deep boreholes. This is a statistically impossible task that ignores the Precautionary Principle  (https://can01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwethenuclearfreenorth.ca%2Fnuclear-waste-information%2Frisk-to-surface-water-nuclear-waste-burial%2F&data=05%7C02%7Cnuclearwaste-dechetsnucleaires%40iaac-aeic.gc.ca%7Cded7e0d8a36c4979bdc508de70fe7f5c%7C35d07687f4f24fbc8b3efa87a26b3b7b%7C0%7C0%7C639072436234168618%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C60000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=NKqUmjMjqmNHRe%2FmrizvnLgdpGY8y%2FABxUToaD8SSNg%3D&reserved=0). 

III. THE CHEMICAL INSTABILITY OF THE BENTONITE SEAL  

The Proponent (NWMO) identifies the high salinity of the deep groundwater at Revell as evidence of "stagnation." However, technical data from the SKB IPR-08-04 Copper Canister Retrieval Experiment  (https://can01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fskb.se%2Fpublikation%2F1600861%2Fipr-08-04.pdf&data=05%7C02%7Cnuclearwaste-dechetsnucleaires%40iaac-aeic.gc.ca%7Cded7e0d8a36c4979bdc508de70fe7f5c%7C35d07687f4f24fbc8b3efa87a26b3b7b%7C0%7C0%7C639072436234189001%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C60000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=D0mlMVBC4Cr6YCv86Ww2z35ZKqOxlfumEEimFtD9%2BSM%3D&reserved=0)reveals that this specific chemical environment—specifically the presence of Calcium Chloride (    ???????? 2)—is a primary threat to the repository's integrity.

·                 Verified Chemical Action: The study's conclusions regarding the interaction between the brine and the seal are definitive:

"The slurrying technique, which comprises the heart of the freeing process, brings about a chemical and a mechanical action on the buffer. In order to initiate and maintain a chemical action, all that is required is to keep the bentonite buffer and the salt solution in contact with each other."  

• The 4% Disintegration Threshold: The SKB report (Section 4.4.2) identifies a  ???????? solution with a concentration of only 4% weight as the ideal solvent for the "dissolution of the bentonite buffer." It was selected due to its "verified ability to bring about disintegration of the bentonite."

• The Revell Paradox: By the NWMO’s own site characterization data  (https://can01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nwmo.ca%2Fen%2Fdocuments-and-reports&data=05%7C02%7Cnuclearwaste-dechetsnucleaires%40iaac-aeic.gc.ca%7Cded7e0d8a36c4979bdc508de70fe7f5c%7C35d07687f4f24fbc8b3efa87a26b3b7b%7C0%7C0%7C639072436234209078%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C60000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=DIAyRzX0Eb8A0%2BK7SP%2FRWQ36jW8YBkmHfdQaHZuDnCU%3D&reserved=0), the Calcium Chloride brine at the Revell site is not a minor trace element; it is a concentrated chemical agent. If the groundwater at Revell reaches or exceeds this 4% threshold, the bentonite "seal" will not act as a barrier. Instead, the mere contact between the brine and the clay will initiate a passive chemical disintegration. 

IV. HYROLIC FEALITIES: THE FLOW LOTTERY

International data from the Formark site (SKB R-08-103) proves that water flow at repository depth is not “zero” but highly variable:

Hydrological Metric                                           Swedish Site(Forsmark/Aspo)                         Revell Site NWMO Projections

Median Flow Rate                                                                              0.6 ml/min.                                                              Stated as virtually zero

Measured High - Flow Outlier                                    30.0 ml /min                                                                Undefined / Unmapped

Detection Method                                                                25+ Deep Boreholes                                                          6 Deep Boreholes

These “High-Flow Outliers” act as bridges between the Revell repository and the 4700 surface lineaments, driven  by the “thermal pump” (waste heat) through the water cycle toward the surface.

V. CONCLUSION: THE ENGINEERED COLLAPSE OF THE MULTI-BARRIER SYSTEM  

The IAAC must confront the reality that the NWMO’s "Multi-Barrier System" is a calculated gamble. The project rests on a fundamental chemical incompatibility that international research has already exposed: 

1. Verified Solvent Action: The SKB IPR-08-04 report proves that the simple marriage of bentonite and calcium-chloride brine initiates the chemical disintegration of the buffer. This is a verified solvent actions requiring only "contact" to begin

.

1. A Lifetime of Exposure: By placing this buffer into the extreme salinity of the Revell Batholith, the NWMO is setting in motion a process that will inevitably "slurry" the bentonite, stripping away the primary protection for the waste.

1. The Insufficient "Thin Ribbon": Once the bentonite is compromised, the high-level waste is protected only by the 3mm copper coating  (https://can01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fiaac-aeic.gc.ca%2F050%2Fdocuments%2Fp17520%2F117060E.pdf&data=05%7C02%7Cnuclearwaste-dechetsnucleaires%40iaac-aeic.gc.ca%7Cded7e0d8a36c4979bdc508de70fe7f5c%7C35d07687f4f24fbc8b3efa87a26b3b7b%7C0%7C0%7C639072436234229559%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C60000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=UH4ulfYEgHZPf92WVV9zbM1tHsfrTvUi%2BHqTR4NL3zQ%3D&reserved=0)proposed for Canadian containers. While the Swedes utilized a 50mm copper jacket to withstand these corrosive risks, the NWMO’s "thin ribbon" is scientifically insufficient to survive direct contact with the pressurized, aggressive brines of the Canadian Shield.
2. The Final Conveyor Belt: Once the barriers fail, the "Thermal Pump" of the nuclear waste and the 4,700 surface lineaments will act as a natural conveyor belt, delivering radionuclides directly into the Wabigoon and Turtle River watersheds. 

Final Verdict: The IAAC cannot grant approval to a project where the first line of defense is pre-programmed to dissolve, leaving only a 3mm barrier to protect regional drinking water for eons. The risk of irreversible contamination is a geological and chemical certainty under the current plan.

Sincerely

Robert Irwin

Dryden, Ontario